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Introduction: 
 In 2017, Hannah Arendt is among the few thinkers we can confidently situate within the 
Human Rights canon. In my final semester as a Human Rights major at Bard College, I struggle 
to recall a class in the discipline in which Arendt has not been mentioned. In the exceptional 
scenarios where her name was not included on the syllabus, at least one student always tends to 
introduce her ideas into class discussion, often insistently. I noticed a curious gap in this 
tendency: the readings assigned, including excerpts from The Human Condition, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, and Between Past and Future, rarely dealt explicitly with “human rights.” 
Rather, they dealt with totalitarianism, Arendt’s idiosyncratic notions of activity, freedom, 
nationalism, and — in the one passage that did explicitly deal with human rights — a strong 
critique of the idea of intrinsic rights. For three years, it seemed Arendt was a prolific human 
rights scholar whose fundamental contributions to the discipline my fellow Human Rights majors 
were simply better acquainted with. Surely, I believed, this theorist must have drastically 
expanded upon classical liberalism’s philosophical groundwork for Human Rights, but I had yet 
to encounter the specific contribution.  
 Entering my senior year, I enrolled in Thomas Keenan’s Human Rights Critical Theory 
class and gained more familiarity with the contemporary interlocutors in discussions about 
human rights. Arendt’s name did not go away. On the contrary, most of the contemporary texts 
we read throughout the semester invoked her ideas extensively. We also read the familiar chapter 
from The Origins of Totalitarianism, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights 
of Man,” in the seminar. Nevertheless, I was left with the nagging question: how did this political 
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theorist become such a prominent name in the discourse she seemed to disdain — and even 
moreso if the rest of her work does not contribute to a project of “human rights”? Clearly, 
Hannah Arendt’s eminence transcends the Annandale campus where she taught and 
posthumously rests. A Human Rights Senior Project seemed like the perfect opportunity to 
contemplate these questions.  
 Upon further research, I confirmed my suspicions that Arendt’s philosophy is central to 
discourse about “human rights.” Scholars regularly taught in my human rights classes, like 
Samuel Moyn, Jacques Rancière, Ayten Gündoğdu, Sarah E. Wagner, Giorgio Agamben, Étienne 
Balibar, Ariella Azoulay, Georges Didi-Huberman, Shoshana Felman, Annette Wieviorka, 
Thomas Keenan, and Peg Birmingham have all authored or contributed to works that feature 
Arendt’s name and ideas — from books that sacralize the theorist to articles that condemn her 
ideas. This is not to say that all of these authors embrace Arendt. On the contrary, scholars like 
Annette Wieviorka remain critical of Arendt’s infamous claims about the complicity of Shoah 
victims. Nevertheless, most of these authors do tend to reconcile Arendt’s ideas with the concepts 
of “human rights” and social justice, and all of them affirm Arendt’s place in the canon. One of 
Bard’s Human Rights professors, Roger Berkowitz, even leads the Hannah Arendt Center for the 
Humanities and Politics, and also conducts a virtual reading group that discusses Arendt’s books. 
The Arendt Center frequently publishes essays pertaining to social justice issues and the critical 
debate of contemporary policymaking, such as gun control, and thus exemplifies one of the ways 
Arendt’s theory has come to be deployed in the name of “human rights.” 
 It is imperative to note my use of the term “human rights” in this paper; I write with the 
twofold definition of human rights as those rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights as well as the subjects of books discussed in my Human Rights classes at Bard 
College. This project does not endeavor to resolve the contentious, perennial question of what 
human rights are. Rather, for the sake of this project I take “human rights” to mean a well-
intentioned social justice project that manifests in various forms and is characterized by appeals 
to the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also important to 
consider that I am discussing this social justice project as it is institutionalized in American 
academia, rather than law, government, or non-governmental organizations.   
 This project is informed by two events. The first was the realization that Hannah Arendt 
has been rendered a kind of patron saint of the Human Rights discipline, and that the critical 
theoretical literature published over the past five to ten years and taught in my classes 
perpetuates this canonization. The second event was the discovery that Hannah Arendt held 
views contrary to what most students in the Human Rights department would consider consistent 
with the discipline’s intentions. In other words, regardless of how they would define “Human 
Rights,” students conceive of the discipline as a social justice-oriented project that is anti-racist. 
Curiously, Hannah Arendt wrote an article, On Little Rock, defending segregation in the 
American South in terms that are explicitly racist and with premises that contradict a conception 
of human rights that privileges justice and equality. Arendt also dismisses the role of law as an 
instrument for ensuring human rights — a critique whose place in discussions about human 
rights is merited, but an argument for which Arendt deploys unnecessarily reactionary rhetoric in 
order to make.  
 This project will consider the way that Hannah Arendt’s theoretical framework is being 
invoked and adopted by contemporary thinkers associated with “Human Rights,” by way of their 
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positions within Human Rights departments at American universities. It also considers the 
inclusion of these author’s works in the syllabi of the Human Rights department at Bard College. 
The project will proceed by proposing the two schools of though under which the interlocutors I 
encountered in my research fall: those who see Arendt primarily as a social justice icon whose 
work should be reconciled with contemporary human rights theory, and those who see Arendt’s 
philosophy as a distinct social justice project that engenders the productive critique of human 
rights.  The first school sees Arendt’s ideas and biography as essential in constructing arguments 1
for human rights and justifying the mechanisms necessary to ensure rights, while the latter sees 
Arendt’s philosophy as a distinct and superior map to social justice than human rights. While it 
can be argued that the writers I discuss often fall somewhere between these two poles, it is 
important to remember that I do not construct this model in order to affix each theorist to a 
position along the rhetorical spectrum. Rather, I propose this heuristic in order to illuminate the 
ethical lacunae along the spectrum that initially provoked this critique of Arendt’s canonization 
in Human Rights. 
 My first chapter explicates the first of the aforementioned schools of thought and situate 
appropriate prominent theorists, such as Ayten Gündoğdu and Giorgio Agamben, within this 
group. Taking Gündoğdu’s appropriation of Arendtian concepts as an exemplar, I will closely 
read Rightlessness in the Age of Rights as well as the original passages by Arendt that inform 
Gündoğdu’s claim that Hannah Arendt’s philosophy is imperative to how we imagine human 
 A note on language: throughout this paper, I regularly use the phrase “justice project,” which comes 1
directly from Wendy Brown’s article, Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism. Brown deploys the term 
“international justice project” to describe the slot that activists attempt to fill with Human Rights, Marxism, 
or similar systems of theory and praxis that concern global justice. This is a specific strain of the “political 
projects” Brown writes about, and I found the language of “justice projects” valuable for explicating and 
critiquing the distinct schools of thought to which I devote my first two chapters. 
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rights. Throughout this reading, I analyze the premises Arendt employs for her arguments and 
read them alongside the most rudimentary rights claims, such as the prohibition of slavery in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I choose this example because, while “human rights” is 
a dauntingly equivocal term to use in this kind of paper, the prohibition of slavery is quite 
possibly the least contentious provision of the Human Rights project in its various 
manifestations.  At the same time, Arendt’s discussion of slavery and her argument for opposing 
the institution provide a startlingly reactionary rationale. I will conclude this chapter by arguing 
that this rationale begs further interrogation about Arendt’s centrality within the Human Rights 
canon.  
 The second chapter turns to a second school of thought, made up of those who embrace 
Hannah Arendt as the proponent of a social justice project that is somehow more 
comprehensively just than human rights. This school of thinkers is much more critical of Human 
Rights, yet even more prone to uncritically romanticizing Hannah Arendt than the first school. 
Because the authors I discuss in this chapter tend to use “human rights” to refer to highly 
specific, idiosyncratic concepts, I confine most of this chapter to the close reading of one short 
work. For this close reading, I chose an essay by Roger Berkowitz that was published on the 
Arendt Center’s website, in which Berkowitz adopts Arendt’s rhetoric from On Little Rock to 
critique German activists who invoked “human rights” to critique the 2012 ban on circumsision 
in Germany. This choice was simple because the essay exemplifies the way the second school 
uses Arendt’s theory to propel an agenda invoking social justice, but simultaneously insists on 
critical distinction from “human rights” activists. Berkowitz was also an apt choice because his 
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subject is the same explicitly racist article by Arendt that alerted me to Arendt’s ironic 
canonization.  
 Rather than continuing to deal with the appropriation of Hannah Arendt’s political theory, 
my third chapter turns away from contemporary interlocutors and draws attention to the aspects 
of Arendt’s oeuvre that beg further attention. That is, during my research, I was surprised at the 
dearth of critical responses to much of Arendt’s writings that deal with race and class, especially 
considering her eminence in a social justice-oriented discipline. While I do touch on many of 
these moments throughout my first two chapters, the third chapter focuses exclusively on some 
contradictory passages from The Origins of Totalitarianism that have been eschewed by the 
theorists who invoked the book in the first two chapters. As I close read the remaining passages 
from Arendt’s works that might render her place in the human rights canon dubious, I consider 
ways in which the theorists’ premises can work both for and against specific human rights claims 
and why they have found such widespread appeal.  
 What one omits can be just as significant as what one includes when appealing to the 
prominent intellectual tradition within which Arendt has been sacralized, but this paper is not 
simply advocating for a thick description over Arendt versus the thin description. Neither is my 
argument the simplistic claim that Hannah Arendt was racist and therefore her ideas should be 
dismissed in a justice project that purports to be anti-racist. Ultimately, this is a paper about how 
Arendt’s confounding notion of justice is being reconciled with contemporary projects, whether 
they purport to be “human rights” or even distinct justice projects that claim supremacy to 
“human rights.”  
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 Martin Heidegger, a philosopher whose Nazism people still struggle to reconcile with his 
oeuvre, was Arendt’s professor and lover. While there are glaring similarities between mentor 
and mentee, the explicit integration of Arendt’s racism and classism into the same claims that are 
currently being celebrated and appropriated by Human Rights scholars distinguish her from 
Heidegger. With Heidegger, to claim that the philosopher’s actual theories of authenticity and 
existentialism are racist — rather than just the author — is still frequently dismissed as 
contentious. A close reading of Arendt is not so different from a thick reading of Arendt; the 
ethical paradoxes in her work are conspicuous throughout, and need no biographical context. No 
matter how similar Arendt and Heidegger may be, to dismiss this project as a recapitulation of 
“how to read Heidegger?” is to recommit an essentialism that misses the point: that Arendt and 
her disciples inherit and tend to perpetuate reactionary assumptions about humanity and justice.  
 Arendt likely appeals to contemporary Human Rights scholars because of her critical 
ideas about history, anti-totalitarian agenda, position as an intellectual who experienced 
rightlessness firsthand, defense of the individualism, and her subtle but consistent dismissals of 
relativism. However, her canonization within Human Rights advances reactionary assumptions 
that contradict any justice project meant to address today’s ethical questions. Regardless of 
intentionality, these assumptions provide premises that have historically been invoked to justify 
Nazism, the slave trade, and segregation. In other words: their place in the Human Rights canon 
begs for critical reading.  
 And what is the urgency of this thesis? At a time when Neo-Nazis are claiming the 
legitimacy of white supremacy through appeals to Friedrich Nietzsche and Theodor Adorno, 
perhaps we should not only be more critical of whose ideas we invoke; perhaps the longstanding 
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assumptions Human Rights critics inherit and perpetuate from a liberal tradition warrant just as 
much criticism as they offer.  
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Chapter 1: Arendt as Human Rights Muse: on the Conditionality of Humanity 
 This chapter deals with the first school of Arendtian critics that I propose: those who see 
Arendt as a Human Rights muse. That is, scholars in this school believe that while Arendt was 
critical of the notion of human rights after experiencing rightlessness, her work still somehow 
serves as a starting point to reify universal rights. Members of this school stress that even though 
Arendt’s theory is critical of human rights, it does not dismiss rights as an impossibility. This 
optimism guides the rhetoric of theorists like political scientist Ayten Gündogdu and Giorgio 
Agamben, who identify works like The Human Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism as 
part of a larger project to secure universal human rights. This chapter will proceed with a close 
reading of Gündogdu’s approach, as she is one of the most rigorous and erudite scholars to 
appropriate Arendt’s work in this way.  
 In her book, Rightlessness in the Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary 
Struggles of Migrants, Gündogdu offers a radical “re-reading” of Hannah Arendt’s critical 
categories of labor, work, and action to make a convincing case for the “right to work” and the 
“right to labor” as the activities which generate Arendt’s “right to have rights.” According to 
Gündogdu, the role of Arendtian “action” is usually over privileged in readings of Arendt 
focused on the project of human rights, while “work” and “labor” are eschewed recognition of 
the fundamental roles they play in securing and guaranteeing rights. Gündogdu’s analysis is 
based on case studies of migrant refugees — a sound methodological decision considering how 
the demographic exemplifies the “stateless” people Arendt claims to be “rightless” in her Origins 
of Totalitarianism. Specifically, in Arendt’s chapter “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End 
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of the Rights of Man” she argues that refugees’ lack of membership in a national political 
community, and the subsequent absence of enforcement of their rights by a sovereign nation, 
show that humans are not entitled to rights by dint of their humanity alone. Rather, people derive 
rights from the political aspects of their identities, such as citizenship, that are added to their bare 
humanity.  Gündogdu is convinced that this critique of rights does not paralyze the project of 2
human rights, but rather serves as an aporia that begs us to "rethink" rights in a way that 
interrogates our assumptions and values about rights. In order to advance the unfinished mission 
of human rights, Gündogdu reconciles Arendt’s critique with the possibility of “human rights” in 
the Arendtian terms of “work,” “labor,” and “action” from The Human Condition.  The political 3
scientist is not alone in using Arendtian language to discuss the justice project of human rights, 
as evidenced both by the pervasiveness of Arendt’s name in critical theoretical literature and the 
fact that Bard College’s Human Rights Department and the Human Rights Project operate out of 
a building named the Hannah Arendt Center; if we can say there is a Human Rights canon yet, 
then several of Arendt’s works are among its few obvious constituents. Yet, while Gündogdu 
convincingly shows us that Arendt’s abstinence from an explicit theory of human rights can be 
transcended in Arendt’s own terms in order to engender the very rights she was denied as a 
refugee, a close reading of The Human Condition reveals that the Arendtian framework stands at 
odds with — or is at least prone to being deployed against — the possibility of rights claims 
rooted in the universal dignity of being human. If Gündogdu begs us not to throw the baby out 
 Arendt, Origins, 3022
 Gündogdu, Rightlessness, 203
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with the bathwater, this critical reading of The Human Condition takes a closer look at the 
bathwater in search of pathogens.  
 The first suspicious moment in Gündogdu’s reconciliation of The Human Condition with 
the possibility of universal rights occurs in her discussion of Arendt’s analogy between labor and 
slavery, which I will show to be fatally intertwined with perhaps the most alluring contribution of 
Gündogdu’s reading of Arendt: the concept of persona-as-mask. Per Gündogdu’s reading, Arendt 
critiques human rights as a tragic misnomer for the civil rights guaranteed by citizenship. She 
claims that universal rights could exist for stateless people, but we must first accept the idea of 
personhood, or persona, as the rights-bearing element added to an antecedent human specimen; 
this specimen otherwise lacks innate rights. Gündogdu likens this constructed layer of identity to 
a “mask,” a construct established by law. In this model, rights are deliberated and derived 
through the law rather than any sense of respect or dignity inherent in the human being; human 
beings are naturalized and always already exist, but persona is socially constructed and can only 
exist with respect to membership in a community which recognizes it. This image of the rights-
bearer is a clever rhetorical maneuver to hurdle one of the many aporetic moments encountered 
in an Arendtian contemplation of rights, which Gündogdu joins Arendt in calling “perplexities” 
so as to avoid the connotation of immobility. Indeed, the mask analogy simultaneously serves as 
a heuristic for understanding Arendt’s critique of the Rights of Man and reconciles Arendt’s 
political theory with the possibility of a species-wide entitlement to rights that simply has yet to 
be reified. The conception of the rights-bearing persona as a precarious addition to one’s 
inalienable humanness is productive insofar as it engenders a fantasy in which Arendtian action 
— the category of activity denoting speech and all the other actions that distinguish human 
 12
beings from others — can result in the realization of abstract rights without any qualification 
other than being human.  The proposal is clever and optimistic, and it even defends the 4
possibility of human rights on the same grounds that many use to dismiss the justice project. 
There is only one problem: the idea is not Arendt’s, but rather a formulation of Gündogdu’s own 
that is merely inspired by an Arendtian conception of humanity and personhood that that can be 
just as reactionary to human rights as it can helpful.  
 Arendt’s famous critique of human rights, from The Decline of the Nation-State and the 
End of the Rights of Man, proceeds by distinguishing between civil rights and human rights. Per 
Arendt, civil rights are predicated on an individual’s citizenship and the security that comes with 
a nation’s legal protections. Human rights, on the other hand, do not exist; but if they did, then 
being human would secure rights for every individual. Arendt cites the rightlessness of refugees, 
who are de facto without citizenship, as evidence that human rights do not exist. Nevertheless, 
she does not condemn the idea as impossible, and thus arises the hope of Arendtian possibility of 
human rights that fuels theorists like Gündoğdu.  
 Gündoğdu proposes a heuristic “mask” which is predicated on the shared assumption of a 
citizen / human binary. This distinction recalls the culture / nature binary that Jacques Derrida 
deconstructs in Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, insofar as it 
assumes “citizenship” to be the enriched condition of human development and “humanity” to be 
an essential given. An analogous opposition informs Giorgio Agamben’s binary of bios / zoê. In 
Agamben’s case, bios is the concept denoting biographical and political life, whereas zoê denotes 
basic animation; humans are assumed to have bios, but animals have zoê. To summarize 
 Arendt, Human Condition, 1764
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Agamben’s criticism of universal human rights in Gündoğdu’s terms, when stateless people are 
deprived the “mask of personhood,” they are deprived of bios while retaining zoê.  In Arendt’s 5
language, the citizen is reduced to a mere human.  
 The widespread assumption of this binary undergirds a frustrating amount of aporetic 
discussions about human rights. Hannah Arendt’s book, The Human Condition, takes its title 
from the traditional anthropological project of describing “human nature” and cultural universals. 
In writing a book of this title, Arendt takes for granted that the notion of humanity is, itself, a 
cultural universal. That is, not every individual that human rights interlocutors would deem 
“human” subscribes to a notion of humanity. Take, for example, the eastern Sudanese Uduk tribe, 
many of whose members identify as elk. Consider, also, the runa puma of Ecuador’s Avila 
village. In Quechua, runa signifies person and puma signifies jaguar, but the runa puma occupy 
an unstable position; they are: “beings who can see themselves being seen by jaguars as fellow 
predators, and who also sometimes see other humans the way jaguars do, namely, as prey.”  6
While Arendt’s totalizing project in The Human Condition may align with the universalizing 
mission of Human Rights, its point of departure is a flawed, Eurocentric assumption about the 
point of distinction between human and other. The line between human / non-human is in flux, 
and this line is a difference of place rather than a difference of truth. This is not at all a flaw 
exclusive to Arendt and her disciples, but these scholars nevertheless perpetuate an erroneous 
universalist assumption when they implement binaries like citizen / human, bios / zoê, and mask-
wearer / stateless before treating these distinctions as aporetic.   
 Agamben, Homo Sacer5
 Kohn, How Forests Think, 26
 14
 Benedict Anderson is the historian and political scientist who coined the term “imagined 
community.” While Anderson’s subject is nationalism and its underlying cultural mechanisms, 
the theorist’s language of “imagined communities” facilitates a critique of Arendt and her 
disciples’ human / non-human binary. To be more specific, Anderson proposes that nations are 
imagined communities because a given nation’s constituents can identify with one another 
without ever meeting, and because:  
  Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is 
  always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that  
  makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so  
  much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.  7
 While Anderson employs his concept to describe nations as bound by a shared, imagined 
history and defined by geographical borders, perhaps imagined communities transcend nations. It 
seems that humanity, itself, constitute might constitute an imagined community; the border 
between human and non-human needs to be imagined, and “human” rights as a concept is 
predicated on identification between members of this community. In fact, to advocate “human 
rights” as discussed by Arendt, Gündoğdu, and other human rights theorists involves partaking in 
a hegemonic liberal imagination. The citizen / human distinction for which Arendt is fetishized is 
predicated on the assumption that citizenship is imagined, but humanity is real. Recent 
anthropologists, like Eduardo Kohn, give us evidence that the category of humanity is just as 
imagined as citizenship.  
 Upon close reading, the dangers of a human rights framework rooted in Hannah Arendt’s 
ideas become evident. While “human rights” denotes an image of social justice whose scope is 
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-77
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oftentimes nebulous, freedom from slavery is one of its uncontentious tenets. It is in Arendt’s 
position on slavery that we first encounter friction between the Arendtian image of justice and 
that of human rights, Gündogdu noting:  
  It is worth remembering here Arendt’s criticism of the Greek institution of slavery  
  not simply for its imposition of an unbearable injustice on the slaves but also for   
  its relegation of the free male citizens to a life lived vicariously. Arendt characterizes the  
  lives of these citizens in terms of a a loss despite the fact that they were able to engage in  
  politics in the leisurely time created by freedom from labor.  8
While an opposition to slavery is in accord with human rights, Arendt’s underlying rationale 
stands out and begs closer examination. The passage from The Human Condition that Gündogdu 
cites for her above claim calls into question the degree to which Arendt opposed slavery on the 
grounds of slaves’ inherent entitlement to justice — similar to the rhetoric of “rights”: 
  The price for the elimination of life’s burden from the shoulders of all citizens was  
  enormous and by no means consisted only in the violent injustice of forcing  one part 
  of humanity into the darkness of pain and necessity. Since this darkness is natural,  
  inherent in the human condition — only the act of violence, when one group of men tries  
  to rid itself of the shackles binding all of us to pain and necessity, is man-made — the  
  price for absolute freedom from necessity is, in a sense, life itself, or rather the   
  substitution of vicarious life for real life. Under the conditions of slavery, the great of the  
  earth could even use their senses  vicariously, could “see and hear through their slaves,”  
  as the Greek idiom used by Herodotus expressed it.  9
Gündogdu is right to draw us to Arendt’s reasons for being critical of slavery, since Arendt is 
alarmingly equivocal in her explanation of why slavery is unjust. She does describe the act of 
“forcing one part of humanity into the darkness of pain and necessity” as an “injustice,” but it is 
“by no means” the only one, and even then her most stressed ethical criterion seems to be the 
comprehensiveness of slaveowner’s life experience as opposed to the experience of the slaves. 
In fact, she even likens the general act of laboring to slavery and explicitly claims “enslavement 
 Gündogdu, Rightlessness, 1438
 Arendt, Human Condition, 118-199
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is inherent in the conditions of human life.”  Gündogdu’s summation of the passage also seems 10
to miss Arendt’s use of the word “even”; to live a life only vicariously is a form of deprivation, 
but to “even” be able to live and use one’s senses vicariously through slaves conveys a degree of 
domination that actually expands one’s repertoire of possible life experiences. Arendt’s claim 
that slaves experience “darkness as natural, inherent in the human condition” casts their injustice 
as regular and necessary while simultaneously redirecting focus to pity for “the great” 
slaveowners.   
 This is part of a larger tendency throughout The Human Condition to consider the 
experience of the hegemonic, slave-owning group as unjust and horrific as that of slaves, 
migrants, and the very poor; ennui is considered as heinous as slavery.  
  There is no lasting happiness outside the prescribed cycle of painful exhaustion and  
  pleasurable regeneration, and whatever throws this cycle out of balance — poverty and  
  misery where exhaustion is followed by wretchedness instead of regeneration, or great  
  riches and an entirely effortless life where boredom takes the place of exhaustion and  
  where the mills of  necessity, of consumption and digestion, grind an impotent human  
  body mercilessly and barrenly to death — ruins the elemental happiness that comes from  
  being alive.  11
In this passage, Arendt expounds upon the way slaveowners are themselves deprived by the 
institution of slavery; they are not required to experience the bliss of exhaustion and (necessarily) 
restorative rest, and in turn are prone to experiencing a boredom that precludes “lasting 
happiness.” This is one of several discomforting moments one encounters in a close reading of 
Arendt; the phrase “grind an impotent body mercilessly and barrenly to death” may not 
necessarily conjure images of slavery, but using this phrase to describe the ennui of the rich and 
 Arendt, Human Condition, 83-8410
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 10811
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describe their experience as unjustly worse than the poor laborer’s “elemental happiness” is 
nevertheless unsettling.  
 Arendt’s notion of class — one that is prone to diminishing the injustices experienced by 
the poor — is also revealed in her critique of Marx, during which she writes of the value of 
increasing social wealth: “And what else, finally, is this ideal of modern society but the age-old 
dream of the poor and destitute, which can have a charm of its own so long as it is a dream, but 
turns into a fool’s paradise as soon as it is realized.”  For Arendt, the poor are charming fools 12
and the slaves happy, but the rich and the slaveowners know the truth: slaves may be owned by 
someone else and deprived freedom of movement (to give Arendt the benefit of the doubt I will 
confine our discussion to the “best-treated” Ancient Greek slaves, who were not allowed to stray 
from their otherwise “easy” household life).   13
 This plays into the book’s pervasive and pernicious undertone that “all human beings are 
slaves” — or at least very akin to them — insofar as each human being is subject to the necessity 
of biological metabolism; that “The labor of our body which is necessitated by its needs is 
slavish.”  Interestingly, Arendt writes that slaveowners are the sole exemption from this 14
category in her description of slavery’s purpose: 
  The burden of biological life, weighing down and consuming the specifically   
  human life-span between birth and death, can be eliminated only by the use of   
  servants, and the chief function of ancient slaves was rather to carry the burden of  
  consumption in the household than to produce for society at large.  15
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 13312
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 3113
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 8314
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 188-8915
 18
This passage stands out because it suggests that ancient slaves somehow alleviated their owners’ 
biological burden, which is mysterious in light of Arendt’s frequent references to the body’s 
biological needs as the “metabolism” which explicitly includes the consumptive act of eating. 
Keep in mind that this metabolism is a form of sustenance, which falls under the Arendtian 
category of labor because it exists not for the sake of constructing a durable world (which she 
calls “work”), but rather solely to perpetuate the process of labor.  Her twofold claim that 16
biological life’s burden “can be eliminated” and that slavery existed to “carry the burden of 
consumption” in ancient times assert the possibility of the body’s needs being displaced onto 
another member of the human species both in antiquity and the present. The political theorists’ 
discussion of automation and Marx’s predictions, however, is in tension with the idea that 
slaveowners were successful in passing off to their slaves the labor they found so odious (yet 
also necessary for happiness): 
  The danger that the modern age’s emancipation of labor will not only fail to usher in an  
  age of freedom for all but will result, on the contrary, in forcing all mankind for the first  
  time under the yoke of necessity, was already clearly perceived by Marx when he insisted 
  that the aim of revolution could not possibly be the already-accomplished emancipation  
  of the laboring classes, but must consist in the emancipation of man from labor. At first  
  glance, this aim seems utopian, and the only strictly utopian element in Marx’s teachings. 
  Emancipation from labor, in Marx’s own terms, is emancipation from necessity, and this  
  would ultimately mean emancipation from consumption as well, that is, from the   
  metabolism with nature which is the very condition of human life. Yet the developments  
  of the last decade, and especially the possibilities opened up through the further   
  development of automation, give us reason to wonder whether the utopia of yesterday  
  will not turn into the reality of tomorrow, so that eventually only the effort of   
  consumption will be left of “the toil and trouble" inherent in the biological cycle to whose 
  motor human life is bound.  17
According to this passage, the same biological labor for which the Ancient Greek institution of 
slavery existed to redistribute — thus enslaving some and while subjecting their owners to the 
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injustice of boredom — is and has been a “utopia,” but one which automation and technological 
advances may render a possibility in the future. This stands at odds with the Arendtian 
understanding of slavery’s function and conception of biology. Surely the slaveowner’s labor in 
this context, his biological needs and processes — and by this I mean the act of eating and 
cellular metabolism — could not literally be passed off to slaves without Marx’s utopian 
technology. Clearly, a deeper understanding of Arendtian biology remains to be unpacked here.  
 In fact, this is an example of one of the “perplexities” Gündogdu writes about 
encountering in Arendt’s oeuvre, albeit not the kind she chose to focus on. This meditation on 
Arendtian aporia is largely inspired by the sharp ways in which Gündogdu hurdles what others 
dismiss as logical paradoxes in a way that advances her personal agenda of human rights. 
Similarly to the way Gündogdu reconciled the perplexity of an Arendtian notion of Human 
Rights by developing the inspirational persona-as-artificial mask construct, I intend to show how 
such perplexities are equally prone to being resolved in a reactionary way due to an ideological 
incompatibility with the species-wide guarantee of rights entrenched within the Arendtian 
framework. The aim of this project is to admonish other Human Rights practitioners and 
theorists from uncritically borrowing Arendtian ideas without considering the possibility that 
debts to such an equivocal philosophy may be collected in the form of the reactionary 
appropriation and inversion of these ideals. This anxiety is inspired by what we have recently 
witnessed in white nationalist leader Richard Spencer, and the “identitarian alt-right;” the 
appropriation of the language of identity politics and intellectual appeals to authority in the name 
of hate and white supremacy  lend urgency to this project of close reading.  
 20
 In order to make sense of the perplexity of ancient slaveowners’ “biological labor” having 
been conducted by their slaves while the “utopia” in which automation may first abstract human 
beings from such labor simultaneously is only possible in the future, a close reading of the 
Arendtian “biology” and the species-wide “humanity” is necessary. To begin with, in Arendt’s 
distinction of labor, work and action, each category of activity possesses a corollary term 
denoting the specimen who performs the action; one who labors is an “animal laborans,” one 
who works is a homo faber or “craftsman,” and one who acts is called a “man of action.” Note 
that the “craftsman” and the “man of action” feature the word “man” in the terms Arendt uses to 
denote them — a deliberate acknowledgment of their humanity — while the animal laborans is 
only described in Latin. This is our introduction to the loaded, mysterious discipline of Arendtian 
Biology, which borrows from Orthodox Biology the form of binomial nomenclature in order to 
tragically show that one can be a member of the human species without constituting “man.” One 
who labors is not even a member of the genus homo, unlike the craftsman whose humanity is 
initially conveyed in English before his Latin affirmation in homo faber. Rather, the animal 
laborans is a species of an altogether different “nature” from other human specimens, if not in 
physical form, then in a quintessentially Arendtian form that is constantly shifting between the 
traditional biological (physical) realm of forms and the artificial — or socially constructed — 
realm of forms; Arendt tells us that what lies behind the mask is unstable.  On the classification 18
of the animal laborans as either “human” or “animal,” Arendt writes: 
  The slave’s degradation was a blow of fate and a fate worse than death, because it carried  
  with it a metamorphosis of man in to something akin to a tame animal. A changein a  
  slave’s status, therefore, such as manumission by his master or a change in general  
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  political circumstance that elevated certain occupations to public relevance, automatically 
  entailed a change in the slave’s “nature.”  
   The institution of slavery in antiquity, though not in later times, was not a device  
  for cheap labor or an instrument of exploitation for profit but rather the attempt to  
  exclude labor from the conditions of man’s life. What men share with all other forms of  
  animal life was not considered to be human. (This, incidentally,  was also the reason for  
  the much misunderstood Greek theory of the non-human nature of the slave. Aristotle,  
  who argued this theory so explicitly, and then, on his deathbed, freed his slaves, may not  
  have been so inconsistent as modern times are inclined to think. He denied not the slave’s 
  capacity to be human, but only the use of the word “men” for members of the species  
  man-kind as long as they are totally subject to necessity). And it is true that the use of the  
  word “animal” in the concept of animal laborans, as distinguished from the very   
  questionable use of the same word in the term animal rationale, is fully justified. The  
  animal laborans is indeed only one, at best the highest, of the species which populate the  
  earth.  19
 For the sake of clarification, I am going to introduce the term Homo sapiens. It is 
important to remember Arendt never explicitly uses this term in The Human Condition despite 
her obvious inspiration by its taxonomical form. By Homo sapiens, I mean all individual 
members of the species known as human: that bipedal primate that the non-Arendtian discipline 
of Biology tells us possesses 46 chromosomes, and the bearer of “Human Rights” in its 
universalist conception. The Arendtian argument is that the Homo sapiens is a stable, antecedent 
being who takes one of three “natures”: the animal laborans, homo faber, or the man of action. 
These “natures” are not necessarily permanent, as the example above of a slave’s manumission 
by his master demonstrates. Per Arendt’s reading of Aristotle’s theory on the humanity of slaves, 
we learn that the “non-human” slave still maintains the “capacity to be human.” In this way, a 
slave who typifies the animal laborans is Homo sapiens, yet not human in the Arendtian sense, 
barring manumission or newfound public relevance. In short, Homo sapiens denotes the stable, 
essential and — most importantly — inalienable virtue of belonging to a species that 
universalists strive to connote with terms like human, stateless, and zoê. The fact that we cannot 
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equate the biological species to the term “human” confirms that the corresponding ideas of 
citizen, persona, and bios constitute an imagined community distinct from biological fact. 
Gündogdu contradicts the inalienability of belonging to a biological species in her reading of 
Arendt when she conceives of Arendtian persona as a constructed mask:  
  Although Arendt does not mention the religious lineage of personhood, she targets the  
  metaphysical idea that it gives rise to, as she argues that it is the artificial mask that  
  makes a human being a person entitled to rights. In the absence of this mask, one appears  
  to others as a “natural man” stripped of all political and legal rights and duties: “a human  
  being or homo in the original meaning of the word, indicating someone outside the range  
  of law and the body politic of the citizens, for instance a slave — but certainly a   
  politically irrelevant being. Deprived of the artificial mask provided by legal personhood, 
  the stateless fall “outside the pale of law” and appear to others in their naked humanness  
  or as “unqualified, mere existence.”  20
Gündogdu’s image of the “natural man” behind the mask, the “homo in the original sense of the 
word,” is not consistent with our close reading of Arendtian humanity. To test this theory, 
substitute the Aristotelian slave — an instance of the animal laborans we are told lacks 
Arendtian humanity — for the “natural man stopped of all political and legal rights and duties” 
in the above passage. Now consider the question: is Gündogdu correct in describing this being as 
“in their bare humanness?” In a sense, yes: the slave is still a Homo sapiens in possession of an 
inalienable form, which is what Gündogdu means by “homo in the original sense.” However, as a 
close reading of Arendtian Biology has demonstrated, the animal laborans is denied Arendt’s 
idiosyncratic “humanity” that the homo faber or man of action possess by virtue of 
nomenclature, but to which the animal laborans is clearly excluded. This renders the slave a 
human in the clearly intelligible Homo sapiens sense, but simultaneously non-human in the 
Arendtian framework within which Gündogdu makes her argument; upon a close reading of The 
Human Condition, humanity is shown to be an equivocal category when Gündogdu and the 
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many other theorists who attempt to reconcile Arendt with their various conceptions of “human 
rights” make the fatal flaw of assuming its stability. Opting to pick and choose what we think can 
advance Human Rights’ project of social justice while ignoring how the same rhetoric allowed 
Arendt’s personal life and opinions to curiously clash with the few uncontentious tenets of the 
project is a dangerous misstep in the construction of the discipline’s critical canon. A continued 
consideration of Gündogdu’s otherwise brilliant Rightlessness exemplifies these perils: 
  Arendt’s comparison of statelessness to slavery, which I discuss in the next chapter,  
  suggests that rightlessness involves this most comprehensive form of depersonalization in 
  a certain sense; both the slaves and the stateless, she argues, are denied even “the  
  possibility of fighting for freedom.”  21
As my close reading of Arendtian humanity has shown, the “persona” of the rights-bearing 
Homo sapiens’ is not the only element of its identity that can be denied. The “humanness” that 
lies behind the mask in Gündogdu’s critical theory is also precarious rhetoric, if we are to apply 
Hannah Arendt’s philosophy to the mission of inalienable rights. This “most comprehensive form 
of depersonalization” is still less severe than the “dehumanization” to which we now understand 
as a possible cause of the stateless’ preclusion from the “possibility of fighting for freedom;” we 
can no longer deduce that the “removal of the mask” engenders the violation of the stateless’ 
rights.  
 This reading obfuscates Gündogdu’s idea that human rights can be achieved through a 
social action that hasn't been completed yet — the extension of a legally constructed persona to 
all individual Homo sapiens — because it shows that even if a stable “mask” is created, the 
stability of the “face” to which it would be applied in this analogy cannot be taken for granted; 
no matter how excellent the mask maker, human artifice cannot be tasked with designing a mask 
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for Proteus. Arendt’s own comparison of statelessness and slavery only bolsters this critique, as it 
suggests that the instability of Arendtian humanity we witnessed in my close reading of slavery 
in The Human Condition can be applied to the philosopher’s own analogy. In fact, her analogy 
goes further in this respect: 
   Arendt’s analogy suggests that the stateless share with the slaves a condition of  
  rightlessness defined by the loss of a share in the coming world constituted in and  
  through action and speech. The rise of lip-sewing and other forms of self-inflicted harm  
  must be understood within the context of violent conditions that deny asylum seekers,  
  refugees, and undocumented immigrants “even the possibility of fighting for freedom,” to 
  use Arendt’s terms, by placing them in detention centers and camps isolated form the  
  political and human world. 
  Arendt’s comparison of slavery and statelessness also underscores that the   
  stateless find themselves in a worse condition in some respects:  22
  [Even] slaves still belonged to some sort of human community; their labor was   
  needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To   
  be a slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society — more   
  than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human.  23
The claim that “the stateless find themselves in a worse condition” in some respects is striking 
because it further engenders the reading that the stateless are rightless not because they lack the 
legal protections of “personhood,” but that they lack recognition of their “humanity” in a way 
that threatens the universalist project of human rights rooted in the virtue of being human. 
Arendt’s own description of slaves as “still within the pale of humanity,” at first glance, calls into 
question my reading of the animal laborans as the dehumanized Homo sapiens. Yet, regardless 
of Arendt’s own inconsistency in her views on the humanity of slaves between The Human 
Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism, the word “even” once again plays a pivotal role in 
the meaning of Arendt’s passage: the tone of this passage strongly implies that even if slaves 
were kept within the pale of humanity, the stateless are not so lucky. Here, it is important to note 
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that Arendt’s “pale of humanity”  does not, by default, include every member of Homo sapiens. 
Human rights are only significantly better than the qualified, national rights Arendt proposes in 
“The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” if they are indeed 
universalized among every specimen of Homo sapiens. In an ideological system like Arendt’s, in 
which humanity is a qualification we cannot take for granted, the ostensible solution to the 
problem of justifying rights in lieu of an additional qualification is destabilized and rendered 
precarious; the “human” of “human rights” whose premise universalist rhetoric is founded in 
becomes yet another manifestation of the “qualification” it was employed to combat.  
 In short,  Ayten Gündogdu’s radical “re-reading of Arendt against Arendt” demonstrates a 
very clever and inspirational way of transcending the “perplexities” of human rights that readers 
traditionally dismiss as impasses. She shows us that the “paradoxes” of Arendt’s philosophy do 
not necessarily preclude the possibility of a Human Rights compatible with Arendtianism. While 
Gündogdu takes on the painstaking task of reconciling the justice project of human rights and 
Hannah Arendt’s theory with incredible lucidity and formidable intelligence, I am left with the 
question: why Arendt? Why has this theorist, whose thought is so staunchly in tension with even 
the most minimalist conception of human rights, become so canonized within Human Rights as a 
discipline? While Gündogdu shows us that aporia can be surpassed with the right amount of 
thought, my close reading of slavery and Arendt’s idiosyncratic “biology” in The Human 
Condition shows that, while Arendtian perplexities are able to be be resolved in a way that 
advances the project of human rights, they are at least as prone to being exploited in ways that 
justify violence. This is a warning against using Arendt’s philosophy as an ersatz for a distinctly 
“Human Rights” school of critical thought. The theorist’s oeuvre may reveal ways of thinking 
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that are enticing because they function similarly to human rights rhetoric — such as proposing a 
totalizing concept of the human — but there are risks inherent to canonizing a thinker whose 
theory and practice oppose the most rudimentary rights claims and social justice initiatives. 
Namely, Arendtianism is an ideological weapon Human Rights theorists may be tempted to use, 
but it is one against which they severely lack protection in the feasible case of its appropriation 
by reactionaries on the intellectual right-wing; this chapter illustrates the unstable way Arendtian 
theory deals with slavery, and the next will examine its approach to racial segregation and 
economic inequality. While Gündogdu has excelled in showing us that aporia does not mean we 
have to abandon an intellectual mission, I ultimately hope to have shown in this chapter how 
transcending an impasse carries the risk of fatal ethical disorientation.  
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Chapter 2: Arendtian Justice Versus Human Rights: the Injustice in Justice 
“It has been said, I think again by Mr. Faulkner, that enforced integration is not better than enforced 
segregation, and this is perfectly true. The only reason that the Supreme Court was able to address itself 
to the matter of desegregation in the first place was that segregation has been a legal, and not just a 
social, issue in the South for many generations.”  
“Like most people of European origin I have difficulty in understanding, let alone sharing, the common 
prejudices of Americans in this area. Since what I wrote may shock good people and be misused by bad 
ones, I should like to make it clear that as a Jew I take my sympathy for the cause of the Negroes as for all 
oppressed or underprivileged peoples for granted and should appreciate it if the reader did likewise.”  24
— Hannah Arendt 
 The second school of Human Rights academics to affirm Hannah Arendt’s centrality to 
Human Rights critical theory differs from the first school because its scholars write from a 
position that maintains critical distance from Human Rights. This is not to say that these scholars 
occupy positions outside the academic discipline or institutions of Human Rights; on the 
contrary, the exemplar of this school whom I will analyze in this chapter is a professor who 
teaches in Bard College’s Human Rights Department. What I mean by “critical distance” is that, 
when writing, theses academics establish that they are not the “human rights advocates” they 
write about. On the other hand, their narrative style indicates that they nevertheless identify as 
proponents of a justice project. What distinguishes this school of thinkers from Human Rights 
critics more broadly is its members’ presumption that their own justice project is superior to their 
idiosyncratic conceptions of “Human Rights,” and that their personal justice projects almost 
completely informed by Hannah Arendt’s oeuvre. 
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 The most staunch members of the second school that I encountered in my research 
include Peg Birmingham, author of the book Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, and Roger 
Berkowitz, author of numerous essays and an anthology of Arendt’s work. Berkowitz is a 
professor of Political Studies, Philosophy, and Human Rights at Bard College. He is also the 
director of the Hannah Arendt Center, which houses the Human Rights Project at Bard College. 
The Hannah Arendt Center’s website conducts a virtual reading group, led by Berkowitz, in 
which anyone can join to read and discuss Arendt’s works with others. The site also hosts dozens 
of essays applying Arendt’s theories to contemporary events and political problems —  all of 
which are authored by Berkowitz. Exemplary of these essays is his 2012 “Circumcision and 
Segregation,” published under the heading “Arendt and Justice,” in which the academic applies 
Arendt’s ideas about distinct public, social, and private realms and rights to the case study of 
Germany’s ban on circumcision. In it, Berkowitz presents a compelling critique of human rights 
activism while reconciling an Arendtian project of justice with one form of antiracism (that 
against antisemitism), but its rhetoric is rooted in Arendt’s Reflections on Little Rock — an 
explicitly racist defense of segregation in the American South.  This chapter entails a close 
reading of Arendt’s article with the twofold intention of evaluating Berkowitz’s critique of 
human rights and finding the faults in a human rights “justice project” (to borrow a term from 
Wendy Brown) rooted in Arendtian notions of rights. 
 Berkowitz writes that the German case’s “conflict between Human Rights and privacy” 
recalls Arendt’s article, which has been “roundly criticized but less well understood.” As a 
starting point, it is valuable to consider the ways Arendt herself employs the terms Berkowitz 
treats as a binary. An analysis of Arendt’s discussion of “rights” in On Little Rock reveals some 
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details about the political theorist’s notion of rights that are usually overshadowed by her critique 
of human rights in the Origins of Totalitarianism. Namely, Arendt enumerates several classes of 
rights which constitute a hierarchy, the apex of which are human rights:  
  For the crucial point to remember is that it is not the social custom of segregation that is  
  unconstitutional, but its legal enforcement. To abolish this legislation is of great and  
  obvious importance and in the case of that part of the Civil Rights bill regarding the right  
  to vote, no Southern state in fact dared to offer strong opposition. Indeed, with respect to  
  unconstitutional legislation, the Civil Rights bill did not go far enough, for it left   
  untouched the most outrageous law of Southern states — the law which makes mixed  
  marriage a criminal offense.  
   The right to marry whoever one wishes is an elementary human right compared  
  to which the “right to attend an integrated school, the right to sit where one pleases on a  
  bus, the right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of amusement, regardless of  
  one’s skin or color or race” are minor indeed. Even political rights, like the right to vote,  
  and nearly all other rights enumerated in the Constitution, are secondary to the   
  inalienable human rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” proclaimed in the  
  Declaration of Independence; and to this category the right to home and marriage  
  unquestionably belongs. It would have been much more important if this violation had  
  been brought to the attention of the Supreme Court; yet had the Court ruled the anti- 
  miscegenation laws unconstitutional, it would hardly have felt compelled to encourage,  
  let alone enforce, mixed marriages.   25
 This passage is indispensable for imagining an Arendtian rights framework because it 
does three things: classifies different types of rights, prioritizes them, and then analogizes their 
implementation. First, Arendt explicitly describes “human rights,” which are further classified 
into the “inalienable human rights to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and the other 
human rights — like “the right to marry whoever one wishes” — that are “elementary,” yet still 
less urgent than human rights. The right to marry outside of one’s race seems to be “alienable” in 
light of the existence of miscegenation laws, but then again, the ability of human rights to be 
alienated from stateless people is the premise of Arendt’s famous critique in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism; inalienability is a moral imperative rather than an empirical claim. Note that 
Arendt privileges these rights because they are cited in the the Declaration of Independence — a 
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document that pre-existed the Constitution. Furthermore, Arendt’s placement of the “right to 
home and marriage” alongside these rights will prove crucial to Berkowitz’s reading; remember 
that human rights are the “most outrageous” to legally interfere with.  
 Arendt’s subsequent category is that of “political rights.” Per the theorist, political rights 
include the right to vote and everything enumerated in the Constitution. Such privileging of the 
“rights” described in the Constitution is part of Arendt’s larger tendency to sacralize this 
document in her rights-based justice project. If Arendt’s arguments are to be taken as the building 
blocks of human rights claims as a species-wide justice project, it is important to consider that 
this strategy involves presupposing the superior justness of a document that required 
amendments in order for slavery to be banned and for women and people of color to be allowed 
to vote. For historical context, the prohibition of slavery and provision of universal suffrage are 
provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by Article 4 and Article 21, respectively; 
this document was published in 1948, eleven years before Arendt’s musings on desegregation. 
Furthermore, the very fact that Arendt introduces this passage with the insistence that segregation 
is a “social concern” not to be conflated with the legal realm evidences that her evaluation of 
desegregation laws is not conducted in terms of justice, but rather the degree to which 
contemporary laws cohere with the status quo. In her chapter titled “Freedom” from Between 
Past and Future, as well as The Human Condition, Arendt expresses a nostalgia for Ancient 
Athenian “equality” — the qualified citizenship and political participation of free, landowning 
men predicated on the institution of slavery. In fact, Arendt even posits that the Constitution 
contains the only way to resolve “The color question,” which “was created by the one great 
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crime in America’s history and is soluble only within the political and historical framework of 
the Republic.”  26
 Armed with the knowledge that voting is a political right for Arendt, a close reading of 
“voting” reveals one way political rights relate to justice and equality: 
  Segregation is discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more  
  than abolish the laws enforcing discrimination; it cannot abolish discrimination and force  
  equality upon society, but it can, and indeed must, enforce equality within the body  
  politic. For equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its validity is clearly  
  restricted to the political realm. Only there are we all equals. Under modern conditions,  
  this equality has its most important embodiment in the right to vote, according to which  
  the judgement and opinion of the most exalted citizen are on a par with the judgement  
  and opinion of the hardly literate.  27
This passage is crucial because it reveals some of Arendt’s fundamental assumptions about American 
inequality. First, she argues that equality must be enforced by the government in the political realm (from 
which equality originates) but also must not be enforced in the social realm. Per Arendt, the political 
realm entails voting booths, buses, and hotels, but excludes schools; schools are relegated to yet a third 
space, the private realm, on the basis that “education is a question of how a parent raises his or her 
children.”  Second, equality is taken to already exist within the South at the time of Arendt’s writing, and 28
to be embodied in the right to vote. Her assertion that voting situates the opinion of the “most exalted 
citizen” alongside that of the “hardly literate” raises questions as to Arendt’s familiarity with extant voting 
practices in the American South during the time of her writing; in her history of the Citizenship School 
Program in the American South, Susan Kates notes that white election officials regularly administered 
literacy tests to African-Americans in an effort to preclude their voting between 1945 and 1965.  These 29
programs were ubiquitous in the South Arendt wrote about, and could be found in Virginia, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia in the year she wrote On Little Rock. 
Literacy tests did not have a comparable effect on illiterate white voters, who could often register to vote 
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on the grounds that they owned land or were deemed “of good character.”  Arendt’s insistence that “the 30
hardly literate” enjoyed a categorical access to voting rights thus ignores a prevalent racist practice by 
Southern Boards of Elections in order to advance her project of limited government in the name of the 
private.  
 In fact, Arendt grounds her argument for “privacy” in a misinformed concept of United States 
history elsewhere, writing of desegregation and colonialism: 
  The fact that this question has also become a major issue in world affairs is sheer   
  coincidence as far as American history and politics are concerned; for the color problem  
  in world politics grew out of the colonialism and imperialism of the European nations —  
  that is, the one great crime in which America was never involved. The tragedy is that the  
  unsolved color problem within the United States may cost her the advantages she  
  otherwise would rightly enjoy as a world power.  31
In Arendt’s account, the United States is the exceptional world power because it abstained from 
colonialism. However, if Arendt wrote this with cognizance of the Spanish-American War and 
the 1898 Treaty of Paris, she is absolving the country only through a definitional tactic. In fact, 
the work of another theorist of genocide and totalitarianism helps explain one reading of Arendt’s 
denial of American colonialism; Edina Bećirević, Security Studies professor and author of books 
on genocide and the mechanisms of its denial in Bosnia and Herzegovina, uses the term 
definitionalism to discuss the tendency of reactionary academics to redirect attention from the 
critical discussion of mass injustices to quarrels over terminology. Perhaps Arendt was unaware 
of the United State’s seizure of Puerto Rico, Guam, Cuba, and the Philippines. Or perhaps she 
partook in a variation of this definitionalism (admitting there was American imperialism and 
expansionism, but denying colonialism). Either way, this passage betrays Arendt’s complicity 
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with the American exceptionalism with which critics like Michael Ignatieff frequently charge 
human rights theorists and practitioners.  32
 But this project does not aim to dismiss Arendt’s theories for their historical inaccuracy; 
rather, it seeks to question the centrality of Arendtian ideas in contemporary discussions about 
human rights. Returning to the aforementioned quote on segregation and voting, Arendt offers us 
a definition and a normative claim at the heart of her justice project: “Segregation is 
discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more than abolish the laws 
enforcing discrimination.”  Under this definition, segregation is a strictly legal phenomenon, 33
rendered both abstract from “society” and inappropriate as a means to enforce equality; the law 
should not enforce inequality, but it is also not the role of the law to assuage social injustice. This 
idea is foundational to the Arendtian concepts of law and justice and — while it may be prudent 
to those consumed with preventing the rise of new totalitarian regimes — this is something 
Human Rights scholars must not forget. The law, after all, is the same institution theorists like 
Ayten Gündoğdu see as an opportunity for securing rights in accord with other Arendtian ideas 
like work, labor, and the critique of national rights. Yes, totalitarianism is an obvious threat to the 
comprehensive justice project “human rights” suggests, but the ethical lacunae in Arendt’s anti-
totalitarian project might be harder to reconcile with aspirations of social justice than the theory 
merits.  
 Arendt’s ideas about government intervention in the name of social justice surface at 
another point in the Little Rock article, when she recounts the story of a sensational photograph: 
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  However, the most startling part of the whole business was the Federal decision to start  
  integration in, of all places, the public schools. It certainly did not require too much  
  imagination to see that this was to burden children, black and white, with the working out 
  of a problem which adults for generations have confessed themselves unable to solve. I  
  think no one will find it easy to forget the photograph reproduced in newspapers and  
  magazines throughout the country, showing a Negro girl, accompanied by a white friend  
  of her father, walking away from school, persecuted and followed into bodily proximity  
  by a jeering and grimacing mob of youngsters. The girl, obviously, was asked to be a hero 
  — that is, something neither her absent father nor the equally absent representatives of  
  the NAACP felt called upon to be. It will be hard for the white youngsters, or at least  
  those among them who outgrow their present brutality, to live down this photograph  
  which exposes mercilessly their juvenile delinquency. The picture looked to me like a  
  fantastic caricature of progressive education which, by abolishing the authority of adults,  
  implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they have borne their  
  children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the point  
  where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we  
  intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?  34
This passage betrays more about Arendt’s rationale for opposing desegregation in schools, and 
also offers information about one of the philosopher’s characteristic themes: natality. According 
to this passage, desegregation’s presence in public schools was the “most startling” aspect of the 
process. According to Berkowitz’ reading, this is because education is the pinnacle “right of 
privacy.” Arendt also includes a critique of “progressive education” — at the heart of which is 
the mission to integrate public schools — on the basis that adults are absolved responsibility for 
complex social maladies and children should not be left to solve extant social problems. This 
complicates our reading of The Human Condition by obfuscating the notion of natality. Natality 
is usually understood as the aspect of the human condition that engenders individualism and thus 
endows human life with significance, and Arendt’s fascination with the mystery of natality is 
juxtaposed with a preoccupation with mortality by her mentor and lover, Martin Heidegger. 
Margaret Canovan is the political theorist and Arendt scholar who wrote the introduction to The 
Human Condition, which Arendt published only one year prior to her Little Rock article. Per 
Canovan’s reading, natality is the work’s “most heartening message,” and Arendt argues that 
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“faith and hope in human affairs come from the fact that new people are continually coming into 
the world, each of them unique, each capable of new initiatives that may interrupt or divert the 
chains of events set in motion by previous actions.”  In short, Arendt writes of the new and 35
unique characters who enter the world as humanity’s source of hope for social problems in 1958, 
but one year later dismayed the idea that children in integrated schools could address what their 
parents failed to resolve. Reading these two claims against one another reveals the paradoxical 
nature of Arendtian natality: new minds are the source of human individualism, which is our only 
hope for solving social injustices, yet these same minds must be cultivated within the status quo 
before they can be justly burdened with solving social maladies. It is this tension between 
cultivation and conformism from which the concept of “private rights” seems to provide relief. 
 While this perplexity may initially seem like a diversion, I propose that Berkowitz’ case 
for private rights is a clever escape from this rhetorical bind, but one which validates readings 
that conflict with even the most minimalist understanding of rights. This tension is also a 
rhetorical landmine waiting for the theorists, like Gündoğdu, who explicitly try to reconcile these 
ideas with a “human rights” mission. While yielding to Arendtian fallacies may bestow an air of 
authority upon theorists with a social justice agenda, ultimately Arendt’s ideals cannot be 
divorced from the reactionary ideology that undergirds them. 
 In order to disentangle conformism from cultivation, we must take a step back and ask 
the questions whose answer our interlocutors seem to be taking for granted: is privacy important 
to justice, and why? Arendt rationalizes the significance of the hearth and home in her discussion 
of the ancient home: 
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  The sacredness of this privacy was like the sacredness of the hidden, namely, of birth and  
  death, the beginning and end of the mortals who, like all living creatures, grow out of and 
  return to the darkness of an underworld. The non-privative trait of the household realm  
  originally lay in its being the realm of birth and death which must be hidden from the  
  public realm because it harbors the things hidden from human eyes and impenetrable to  
  human knowledge. It is hidden because man does not know where he comes from when  
  he is born and where he goes when he dies.  36
In short, privacy is significant because it historically hosted the key events of the human 
condition — birth and death. Notice the emphasis on the occult and the absence of rights, 
authority and agency in this rationale. Also important is the idea that this sacredness is the “non-
privative” trait of the household, as distinguished from the aspects of home life that deprive one 
the human experience. Arendt claims that since the private man does not appear, it is though he 
does not exist, and is thus deprived the reality that comes from being witnessed by other 
humans.  Ancient slaves, after all, were not seen as complete humans for the very reason that 37
they were confined to the private realm, the home.   38
 This, I believe, is the moment after which privacy’s significance comes to be conflated 
with that of natality. Arendt asserts that “We no longer think primarily of deprivation when we 
use the word "privacy," and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the private sphere 
through modern individualism.”  Thus, in the course of 40 pages, we have encountered the 39
circulus in probando from which the contemporary claims both for and against “human rights” 
are formulated: modern individualism has rendered privacy important, and privacy is important 
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because it fosters individualism despite the conformist pressure of mass culture. Berkowitz’ 
reading of On Little Rock is thus flawless when he recapitulates the merit of privacy:  
  “Private rights are deeply important. It is in the private realm where young people grow  
  up and are led into the world by parents, teachers, and friends. If we value plurality,  
  difference, and individuality, it is essential that we protect the private realm—that world  
  in which individuals are formed in their singularity and uniqueness. As well meaning as  
  human rights advocates may be, they are antagonistic to the private realm. They will  
  forever seek to impose a world of humane conformity at the expense of the singularity  
  suffering. This is the tension that Arendt provokes us to consider.”  40
So, private rights are “deeply important,” but a tautology is a tautology: the private realm must 
be protected to preserve plurality, difference, and individuality, but these values also must have 
pre-existed modern privacy since Arendt claims they are what lent privacy its significance. If we 
suspend our question as to whether the chicken or the egg came first, this quote features two 
interesting moments. First, it reveals that Berkowitz’ conception of “human rights” is inherently 
regulatory and imposing, situating human rights in accord with Arendt’s conception of civil and 
political rights and Gündoğdu’s understanding of human rights as an exclusively legal construct. 
Second, we see Berkowitz affirm Arendt’s relegation of education to the private sphere when he 
includes “teachers” in his list alongside parents and friends. 
 This is where the education Berkowitz writes about diverges from Arendt’s subject. 
Berkowitz’ statement that “It is in the private realm where young people grow up and are led into 
the world by parents, teachers, and friends” is positive, fixing education in the private realm at 
the time he writes. Arendt, on the other hand, writes of education normatively; after all, her entire 
argument and the anxieties about enforced integration informing this argument are predicated on 
the idea that education should be a private matter, but cannot be so long as the government is 
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involved. The unfixed border between “rights of privacy” versus other kinds of rights matters 
because it must be imagined and, more importantly, imagined by a hegemonic subject; the 
difference between these categories is not a matter of universal truth, but rather a function of 
place. Berkowitz explicitly acknowledges one manifestation of this principle when he writes of 
the German court’s decision to ban circumcision in favor of “human rights” over “private rights”: 
  “The German courtʼs decision imagines the parental rights to practice religion as a right  
  to privacy—to determine how to raise their child. Against this right it balances the childʼs 
  human right to bodily integrity. And the court decides the matter on the side of human  
  rights over the right of privacy.”  41
Thus, Berkowitz’ analogy between integration in Little Rock and Germany’s circumcision ban 
holds insofar as private rights are subjugated to other agendas — “social opportunity” in the first 
case, and human rights in the latter — in a way that he condemns as unjust.  What his analogy 42
equalizes, however, cannot be dismissed by any project sincerely invoking “justice”: the German 
government imposed itself in order to legitimate antisemitism and islamophobia while the 
American government did so — counter to Southern public opinion — in an attempt to uproot 
one manifestation of a pervasive racist ideology. One would be called absurd to equate the 
deregulation of marijuana with that of human trafficking, but the essentialist rhetoric in this 
analogy recalls the argument.  
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 Arendt conceives of education neither as a human nor civil right, but rather as a red herring to NAACP 42
members in the pursuit of racial justice, whom she patronizes when she writes: “I have my doubts about 
this, especially with respect to the educated strata in the Negro population, but it is of course perfectly 
true that Negro public opinion and the policies of the NAACP are almost exclusively concerned with 
discrimination in employment, housing, and education. This is understandable; oppressed minorities were 
never the best judges on the order of priorities in such matters and there are many instances when they 
preferred to fight for social opportunity rather than for basic human or political rights. But this does not 
make the marriage laws any more constitutional or any less shameful; the order of priorities in the 
question of rights is to be determined by the Constitution, and not by public opinion or by 
majorities.” (Arendt, On Little Rock, 46)
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 It is this exact tendency for equalization and Arendt’s notion of “equality” that undermine 
Arendtian theory’s ability to contribute much beyond a wariness of totalitarianism to human 
rights as a justice project. In Berkowitz’ reading, Arendtian ethics run counter to Human Rights 
but are cast as more comprehensively just; in the case of Little Rock, Arendt explicitly condemns 
the NAACP and the idea of integrated education as a human, civil, or political right. In order to 
do so, she invokes the priority of political rights mentioned the Constitution, like the right to 
freedom of assembly, and asserts the “Constitution’s silence on education.”  Casting 43
desegregation as an infringement of freedom of assembly presupposes that this right should only 
belong to Southern whites, but this worldview contributes to racial inequality and injustice in 
less obvious ways as well.  
 A close reading of Arendtian “equality” illuminates more circular logic at the kernel of 
Arendtianism that runs counter any antiracist or anti-classist justice project. Namely, Arendt 
insinuates that social equality will somehow engender hatred and injustice rather than assuage it. 
The theorist writes of American equality: 
  In its all-comprehensive, typically American form, equality possessed an enormous  
  power to equalize what by nature and origin is different — and it is only due to this  
  power that the country has been able to retain its fundamental identity against the waves  
  of immigrants who have always flooded its shores. But the principle of equality, even in  
  its American form, is not omnipotent; it cannot equalize natural, physical characteristics.  
  This limit is reached only when inequalities of economic and educational condition have  
  been ironed out, but at that juncture a danger points well known to students of history,  
  invariably emerges: the more equal people have become in every respect, and the more  
  equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences be resented, the 
  more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others.  
   It is therefore quite possible that the achievement of social, economic, and  
  educational equality for the Negro may sharpen the color problem in this country instead  
 “It is perfectly true, as Southerners have repeatedly pointed out, that the Constitution is silent on education and 43
that legally as well as traditionally, public education lies in the domain of state legislation.” (Arendt, On Little Rock,  
54)
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  of assuaging it. This, of course, does not have to happen, but it would only be natural if it  
  did, and it would be very surprising if it did not. We have not yet reached the danger  
  point, but we shall reach it in the foreseeable future, and a number of developments have  
  already taken place which clearly point toward it. Awareness of future trouble does not  
  commit one to advocating a reversal of the trend which happily for more than fifteen  
  years now has been greatly in favor of the Negroes. But it does commit one to advocating 
  that government intervention be guided by caution and moderation rather than by  
  impatience and ill-advised measures. Since the Supreme Court decision to enforce  
  desegregation in public schools, the general situation in the South has deteriorated. And  
  while recent events indicate that it will not be possible to avoid Federal enforcement of  
  Negro civil rights in the South altogether, conditions demand that such intervention be  
  restricted to the few instances in which the law of the land and the principle of the  
  Republic are at stake. The question therefore is where this is the case in general, and  
  whether it is the case in public education in particular.  44
Thus, an Arendtian justice project eschews the pursuit of economic and educational equality on 
the grounds that “the more equality permeates the whole texture of society… the more will 
differences be resented.” Per this logic, the pathogen of the Holocaust was Germany’s 
unprecedented social and educational equality. Also significant is the way Arendt naturalizes 
differences of race and class, adopting the classical assumptions of the Great Chain of Being 
used to justify human inequality in terms of race.  While the political theorist may not have 45
acquired a solid grasp of American military and colonial history by 1959, she had at least 
assimilated to the American norm of biologizing race in a way that justifies colonialism.  
 Arendt’s formulation that the reduction of economic and educational equality amplifies 
the relative significance of “visible and natural” differences — meaning race — in human 
relations is not only dubious, but also commits the same flaw of thoughtless translation for which 
she scolds two millennia of thinkers in The Human Condition. Specifically, I am referring to her 
address of “The profound misunderstanding expressed in the Latin translation of ‘political’ as ‘social’,” 
disseminated by way of Thomas Aquinas.    46
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 Arendt writes of equality in Ancient Greece: “Equality, therefore, far from being 
connected with justice, as in modern times, was the very essence of freedom: to be free meant to 
be free from the inequality present in rulership and to move into a sphere where neither rule nor 
being ruled existed.”  This line proposes a definition of “equality” that is predicated on 47
inequality elsewhere, but its status as a fallacy transcends such obvious critique. This line also 
suggests that “the essence of freedom” runs counter to modern justice, and more importantly that 
equality and justice were not bound up in ancient times, that they are not inherently entangled. 
Furthermore, the English words “liberty” and “freedom” are conveyed in one shared word in 
both the Latin “libertas" and the Ancient Greek “ἐλευθερία.” Consider this as we recall Arendt’s 
sacralization of the Declaration of Independence, in which she celebrates the “right to liberty” as 
one of the highest, inalienable rights.  
 Etienne Balibar is a contemporary French philosopher who shares Arendt’s penchant for 
etymology and the classical virtues of justice and freedom. In his 2014 book, Equaliberty, he 
makes a proposition that helps us deconstruct Arendt’s discussion of equality and justice:  
  If one really wants to read it literally, the Declaration in fact says that equality is    
  identical to freedom, and vice-versa. Each is the exact measure of the other. This   
  is what I propose to call, with a deliberately baroque phrase, the proposition of   
  equaliberty..  48
Balibar is specifically writing in response to a tendency for political theorists, such as Arendt, to 
cast equality and liberty as contradictory. This proposes the possible rationale rationale behind 
Arendt’s fear that alleviating racial inequality would “sharpen the color problem” in the South. 
Balibar, on the other hand, through his reading of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, claims 
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that social inequalities and infringements on one’s liberties always accompany one another; 
equality and liberty always accompany each other.   49
 Following Balibar’s critique, Arendt’s dire warnings that improved social, economic, and 
educational equality for black Americans in the South are rendered contradictory. In fact, 
Arendt’s alleged defense for maintaining racial segregation and socioeconomic inequality lacks 
further justification beyond her prioritization of “individualism” above all other virtues. 
Ultimately, it is this prioritization that academics like Berkowitz take as their premise when they 
invoke Arendt as a the proponent of a social justice project that is more appropriate than human 
rights. 
 This observation turns my critique toward my own use of the terms “human rights” and 
“justice” throughout this paper: I use these terms with the assumption that a justice project ought 
to value “liberty” and “equality” at least as much as “individuality,” and I find myself assuming 
that “human rights” endeavors to do this. This is perhaps ironic— after all, this is a critique of 
the way “Human Rights” is becoming  — but I think there is something significant about the 
prevalence of this assumption throughout Western history. Take, for instance, linguist Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s evidence for the immutability of language in his Course on General Linguistics: 
“The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a 
chariot.”  The association between scales and justice is deeply entrenched in the Western culture 50
from which Human Rights originates. This association harkens back to Ancient Roman religion, 
suggesting the possibility that Western notions of justice have been been entangled with equality 
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throughout the entire intellectual development of Human Rights; Balibar correctly detects this 
entanglement, whereas Arendt interprets the interaction between equality and justice as 
dialectical. Arendtian disciples who subscribe to this worldview — like Berkowitz — have the 
groundwork for a trenchant defense of privacy and individualism, but this rhetoric 
simultaneously arms readers with a validated dismissal of employment, housing, educational, 
and economic rights.  While well-intentioned liberal scholars may find Arendtian theory useful 51
for their own ethical projects, this rhetoric is even more apt for another task: defending the very 
injustices Human Rights scholars purportedly oppose.  
 In short, Roger Berkowitz is an exemplar of one way contemporary intellectuals tend to 
appropriate Arendtian ideas to critique and advance conceptions of justice. Whereas the first 
school of thought I described discusses Arendt as a critical proponent of Human Rights, this 
school tends to discuss Arendt as the vanguard of a novel theory of justice that is superior to 
Human Rights. While the members of this school of thought often find ingenious ways to 
reconcile Arendtian theory with social justice projects, such an act reaffirms Arendt’s intellectual 
authority and, in doing so, lends authority to the explicitly racist and classist premises 
undergirding Arendt’s own arguments. The critiques of Human Rights and social justice 
advanced by this school are valuable, but the rhetoric they deploy is contradictory and 
counterproductive to any project invoking justice and rights.  
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Chapter 3: The Totalitarianism of Origins 
 Whereas the previous chapters delineated and critiqued the two schools of thought that I 
propose contemporary Arendtian theorists constitute, this chapter will take a deconstructive turn 
to focus on Hannah Arendt’s discussion of racism in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Specifically, 
I will closely read the theorist’s genealogy of racism before analyzing the rhetoric underlying her 
discussion of colonialism in South Africa. This chapter relates to my overarching critique of 
Hannah Arendt’s canonization within the Human Rights discipline by examining claims that are 
likely to be cited in a defense of Arendt as an anti-racist vanguard, yet whose rhetoric collapses 
upon close reading. While in my research I did not encounter these passages to be appropriated 
in such a way, this approach exemplifies the trend of representing Arendt as a radical social 
justice icon that lies at the heart of this critique. The passages I examine in this section are 
indispensable to my thesis because they simultaneously provide a liberal critique of racism while 
advancing reactionary premises that undermine Arendt’s reliability as an ethical authority, which 
contributes to my overarching argument. If the two preceding chapters consider a trend that has 
occurred over the past ten years, this chapter is a case study in the contradictions of that trend’s 
source text.  
How Classical Liberal Racism Constructs Anti-Racism 
 Imperialism is the name of Arendt’s second section of the tripartite Origins of 
Totalitarianism. The section’s final chapter, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the Rights of 
Man,” is the critique I have found most frequently referenced in Human Rights classes and 
 45
readings, but the other four chapters comprising Imperialism constitute a lengthy discussion of 
race, racism, and class. Arendt’s first task in this section entails proposing a definition and 
genealogy for racism, which she argues arose at the end of the nineteenth century. Specifically, 
she argues that an intellectual trend called “race-thinking” had existed since the inception of 
nations, but that racism was distinct and novel because it qualified as an ideology. For Arendt, 
“an ideology differs from a simple opinion in that it claims to possess either the key to history, or 
the solution for all the ‘riddles of the universe,’ or the intimate knowledge of the hidden universal 
laws which are supposed to rule nature and man.” The theorist continues to claim that there were 
two dominant ideologies at the time of her writing: “that which interprets history as the 
economic struggle of classes, and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of races.”  52
 Arendt devotes several pages to the distinction between race-thinking and racism, insisting 
that earlier forms of hatred and exploitation between people may resemble racism to the modern 
thinker, but that the term “racism” is anachronistic when discussing human relations before the 
father of racism proliferated the race concept in 1859: Count Arthur de Gobineau.  While Arendt 53
writes that Gobineau was unable to foresee the disastrous effects of the race concept and that 
there were other “believers in race” who preceded him, Gobineau’s popularity at the turn of the 
twentieth century directly engendered racism.  
 If The Human Condition is an anthropological project, then The Origins of Totalitarianism 
is a venture into revisionist history. When reading Imperialism, one is frequently left with the 
question of how Arendt’s critiques of intellectual history can serve to explicate totalitarianism 
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rather than justify it. This is especially true of Arendt’s discussion of the seventeenth century 
historian and translator of Spinoza, Henri de Boulainvilliers: 
  Boulainvilliers was deeply influenced by the seventeenth-century might-right doctrines and 
  he certainly was one of the most consistent contemporary disciples of Spinoza, whose Ethics 
  he translated and whose Traité thêologico politique he analyzed. In his reception and  
  application of Spinoza’s political ideas, might was changed into conquest and conquest acted 
  as a kind of unique judgement on the natural qualities and human privileges of men and  
  nations. In this we may detect  the first traces of later naturalistic transformations the might-
  right doctrine was to go through. This view is really corroborated by the fact that   
  Boulainvilliers was one of the outstation freethinkers of  his time, and that his attacks on the 
  Christian Church were hardly motivated by anticlericalism alone.  
   Boulainvillier’s theory, however, still deals with peoples and not with races; it bases 
  the right of the superior people on a historical deed, conquest, and not on physical fact — 
  although the historical deed already has a certain influence on the natural qualities of the 
  conquered people. It invents two different peoples within France in order to counteract the 
  new national idea, represented as it was to a certain extent by the absolute monarchy in  
  alliance with the Tiers Etat. Boulainvilliers is antinational at a time when the idea of  
  nationhood was felt to be new and revolutionary, but had not yet shown, as it did in the  
  French Revolution, how closely it was connected with a democratic form of government, 
  Boulainvilliers prepared his country for civil war  without knowing what civil war meant.  54
In this passage, Arendt exemplifies her tendency of distinguishing earlier forms of “race-
thinking” from modern racism. This time, she attempts a technical defense: to discriminate 
against different peoples is different from discrimination against races. Arendt goes on to say 
that “two different peoples” were constructed from one French population without invoking 
racism, solely on the grounds that the word “race” was circumvented in the process. 
Furthermore, the Arendtian concept of race is revealed here to be “physical fact.” Without 
addressing the suggestion that race is irrelevant to histories of a given people’s “conquest” over 
another — thereby justifying violence in colonized places — Arendt’s diction in discussing 
Boulainvilliers as an admirable social critic is suspect. After all, Roger Berkowitz is correct in 
detecting Arendt’s priority of “freethinking” and “individualism” above other values in his 
reading of On Little Rock. The rhetorical impetus behind Arendt’s insistence on a highly 
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exclusive definition of “racism” may very well be the protection it garners her own theory from 
criticism.  
 Arendt clearly writes from the position of someone who condemns racism, as evidenced by 
her description of racists as people who discriminate in a way that is violative of “mankind’s 
equality.”  Simultaneously, throughout her prolonged discussion of race and racism as 55
exceptional phenomena, Arendt ironically develops and embraces the same liberal trope that is 
frequently cited by contemporary white supremacists in the United States. Namely, this idea of 
“races” as distinguished from “peoples” or particular “nationals” has been appropriated by 
members of the alt-right — for example White House Strategist Stephen Bannon and think tank 
leader Richard Spencer — to reconcile white supremacy with liberal thought that is assumed . 
This happens when white supremacy is rebranded as “white nationalism,” a distinction about 
which University of London professor Eric Kaufmann writes:  
  “White supremacy is based on a racist belief that white people are innately superior to  
  people of other races; white nationalism is about maintaining political and economic  
  dominance, not just a numerical majority or cultural hegemony.”   56
In distinguishing racism from “race-thinking” in terms of nations or ethnically distinct “peoples” 
within a country, Arendt — albeit inadvertently — architects today’s vogue defense for 
contemporary American white supremacy: if white supremacy is racist, it is the object of 
Arendt’s criticism, but “white nationalism” is explicitly distinguished and situated outside the 
scope of this criticism. This is perhaps the most contradictory implication of an anti-totalitarian 
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book that has become canonized within the larger Human Rights discipline, considering such an 
argument’s potential utility to totalitarian actors. 
 Ultimately, Arendt’s pattern of criticizing racism while simultaneously advancing 
reactionary premises distills to the assumption that the Western liberal tradition is incompatible 
with genocide, slavery, colonization, and similar violence between groups of humans. This is 
revealed when Arendt describes racism as arising only when imperialism necessitated it in the 
early twentieth century, as a result of racism’s “utter incompatibility with all Western political 
and moral standards of the past, even before it was allowed to destroy the comity of European 
nations.”  Arendt’s claim here is that prior to twentieth century imperialism, what she calls 57
“race-thinking” was too innocuous to warrant the label “racism” — even if race-thinking 
facilitated the later development of racism. In a rather shocking aside on this idea, Arendt writes: 
  Among the men who influenced the colonial movement from the middle of the nineteenth 
  century until the outbreak of actual imperialism at its end, not one has escaped the influence 
  of Carlyle, but not one can be accused of preaching outspoken racism. Carlyle himself, in his 
  essay on the ‘Nigger Question,’ is concerned with means to help the West Indies produce 
  ‘heroes.’”  58
I include this passage not to make the simplistic claim that Hannah Arendt is racist, but rather to 
draw attention to the contradictory nature of the theorist’s rhetoric and the strangeness of trying 
to appropriate such rhetoric in the pursuit of an anti-racist conception of justice. Arendt, as well 
as those who invoke her as the patron saint of human rights, can only do so after assuming that 
classical liberal ideals are, in fact, incompatible with the horrors of slavery.  
 In “Race and Bureaucracy,” Arendt’s own position a the narrator is destabilized; in an 
attempt to bridge the gap between her dual position as disciple of canonical German philosophy 
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and critic of racial violence, Arendt makes a number of contradictory claims in rapid succession. 
For example, Arendt condemns the Boer enslavement of the Bantu as “parasitic” in the same 
paragraph that she dehumanizes the native people as “the only raw material which Africa 
provided in abundance;”  on the same page, she calls the colonization of Africa “a senseless 59
massacre” just after the lamentation that “slavery, though it domesticated a certain part of the 
savage population, never got ahold of all of them.”  The theorist claims that “Boer racism, 60
unlike other brands, has a touch of authenticity, and so to speak, of innocence”  while 61
simultaneously upholding that the Boers “decided to use these savages as though they were just 
another form of animal life.”  In the first case, Arendt seems to be appealing to the pervasive 62
Enlightenment trope of the noble savage. In the latter, Arendt uses the language of treating 
people as an exploitative means without treating them as an ends — language introduced to 
Arendt’s own German philosophic tradition by Immanuel Kant over a century earlier.  Over the 63
course of a few pages, Arendt continues to make several assertions that conflict with one another 
and her anti-totalitarian intention more broadly. 
 Critics have frequently discussed Arendt’s complex relationship to Jewry and her own 
position as a Jewish woman, and among them is historian David Nirenberg. In his critical history, 
Anti-Judaism, Nirenberg analyzes the historical use of anti-Jewish tropes throughout the Western 
philosophical canon, ultimately making the argument that “Anti-Judaism is and has long been 
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one of the most powerful theoretical systems for ‘making sense of the world.’”  Arendt suggests 64
that Jews were complicit in Nazism insofar as Jewish immigrants were the financiers of the 
South African gold and diamond mining industries, which the theorist claims Nazi elites like 
Carl Peters treated as a case study in race-making.  Nirenberg proposes an explanation for 65
Arendt's  tendency to make confounding claims like this, writing that the connection between 
Jews and finance was among “the a priori ideological commitments that structured her selection 
and interpretation of ‘facts’ about the Jews.”  Perhaps the same argument can be extended to 66
Arendt’s selection and interpretation of facts about the Bantu (or members of what Arendt calls 
“the Dark Continent” more generally);  if Arendt’s anti-totalitarian theory is predicated on 67
assumptions like the idea that native Bantu were “backward people” without a culture or history, 
and that this “backwardness” was determined by Africa’s geography, perhaps her work’s ability 
to construct a critical response to European racism against South African natives is paradoxical.  
Regressive Progress and the Blackness in Whiteness 
 Arendt’s critique of ideology and the prevalence of racism and class-consciousness as 
modernity’s two dominant ideologies might partially explain her appeal to contemporary critical 
theorists: Arendt seems to offer a prototypical version of postmodern anthropologists’ 
proposition and critique of the masternarrative. The masternarrative critique suggests that there 
are hegemonic, totalizing narratives — such as histories — that are produced by and which serve 
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to perpetuate power structures. Specifically, Arendt critiques the authority of preconfigured ways 
to narrate history that are demanded by given ideologies, writing:  
  Few ideologies have won enough prominence to survive the hard competitive struggle of 
  persuasion, and only two have come out on top and essentially defeated all others: the  
  ideology which interprets history as the economic struggle of classes, and the other that  
  interprets history as a natural fight of races. The appeal of both to large masses was so strong 
  that they were able to enlist state support and establish themselves as official national  
  doctrines. But far beyond the boundaries within which race-thinking and class-thinking have 
  developed into obligatory patterns of thought, free public opinion has adopted them to such 
  an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept a  
  presentation of past or present facts that is not in agreement with either of these views.  68
Arendt’s discussion here reflects a critical awareness of the way unequal human relationships 
inform the ways history is narrated. Unfortunately, the political theorist betrays the limits of her 
historical criticism when narrating the settlement of the Boers in South Africa and the ensuing 
slavery of the native Bantu people. Paradoxically — or, perhaps as collateral damage withstood 
in order to garner appeal to a broader audience — Arendt subscribes to one of her favorite 
narratives to critique: that of capitalism. Even though Arendt critiques “the struggle of the 
classes” as one of the two hegemonic ideologies that wrongly claim to possess the “key to 
history,” she unabashedly defaults to a reductive capitalist narrative to tell the history of South 
African colonialism.  By this I mean the exclusive but dominant definition of history as a 69
people’s “progress” beginning with a nomadic “tribe,” leading later to agricultural settlements, 
then to specialized forms of labor, and ultimately culminating in industrialization.  This 70
temporally fixed template is widely used to discuss human development, but in Arendt’s case 
serves to contradict her proposed position as anti-racist.  
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 Take, for example, the theorist’s discussion of the “white race” in South Africa. In 
Arendt’s use, this category does not include British and other European immigrants, but it does 
include the Boer people — the descendants of earlier Dutch settlers who enslaved many Bantu 
people. For Arendt, the Boers constitute the “white race” as a direct result of their moral 
historical backwardness and subsequent moral naïveté. The Boers are the people who committ  
“the unfathomable massacre of native peoples,” the people who burn their farms and relocate 
inland on “the Dark Continent” whenever later British colonists try to tax their property.  This 71
very tendency for relocation is used to argue that the Boers are reminiscent of South Africa’s 
nomadic and “prehistoric” Bantu natives. In turn, this nomadism is cited as evidence that the 
Boers — along with the Bantu — are further back in time than their European counterparts, since 
their way of life recalls an earlier point on the timeline of the Eurocentric and capitalist 
masternarrative Arendt to which subscribes. The Boers, cast as temporally behind, are 
subsequently labeled naïve and “innocent” on the grounds that they possess no histories of their 
own from which to learn morality. This is the logic underlying Arendt’s claim that “Boer racism, 
unlike other brands, has a touch of authenticity, and so to speak, of innocence.”  This 72
assumption of historical retardation also undergirds the generalization that “the senseless 
massacre of native tribes on the Dark Continent was quite in keeping with the traditions of these 
tribes themselves. Extermination of hostile tribes had been the rule in all African native wars.”  73
This idea has been invoked to justify genocide and the slave trade throughout history.  
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 In a text that repeatedly refers to the Bantu as “savages” and Africa as “the Dark 
Continent,” the trope of the noble savage was bound to make an appearance. What was less 
foreseeable was the way Arendt painted the noble savage with white skin. Arendt’s “white race” 
is predicated on temporal assumptions just as much as it is phenotype, which is why the 
“backward” Boers constitute the white “race” but British colonists are just people without a 
“race.” To be more specific,  Arendt claims that the Dutch settlers who came to be known as the 
Boers arrived as European people, but “degenerated” — in a sense, travelled back in history— 
over the generations into a race: 
  When the Boers, in their fright and misery, decided to use these savages as though they  
  were just another form of animal life, they embarked upon a process which could only end 
  with their own degeneration into a white race living beside and altogether with black races 
  from whom in the end they would differ only in the color of their skin.  74
This passage is significant in a discussion of Arendtian race for two reasons. First, Arendt 
describes the transformation of European settlers into a race as a “degradation,” implying a 
descent within a pre-existing hierarchy of “humanity;” this is the descent from person to white 
person. Second, the theorist makes a claim that seems to contradict the “innocence” of the initial 
Boer enslavement of the Bantu: if the Boers “degenerated” into a race, it suggests that they 
began in South Africa as full-fledged European people before transitioning into the “white race” 
of noble savages; upon arriving, the Boers had “a history of their own,” so it follows that the 
very Boers who enslaved the Bantu indeed had the moral self-consciousness that the noble 
savage lacks. The innocence to which Arendt ascribes the Boers is therefore a contradiction. 
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 Paradoxes like this arise throughout Arendt’s oeuvre when she uncritically accepts classical 
liberal philosophy as radically critical of racism. Arendt is an author who flickers between the 
opposing positions of the anti-racist critic and someone who idealizes the same German 
philosophers who have historically been invoked to legitimize racism and antisemitism. For 
example, Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel argues in his 1837 Natural Context or the 
Geographical Basis for World History that a region’s geography is deterministic of its 
inhabitants’ ability to possess moral self-consciousness and, in turn, history. This explains 
Hegel’s premise: “In this main portion of Africa, history is out of the question.”  Arendt 75
uncritically accepts this premise in her depiction of the Boers as “without history” when she 
claims that the Boers’ time in Africa and their treks further inland rendered them more like the 
“savage” natives, thus supplanting their “history” with the designation of a “race.”  In addition 76
to Hegel, Arendt’s philosophy is heavily informed by that of her mentor, Martin Heidegger, who 
was a Nazi and author of a series of explicitly anti-semitic notebooks. However, Heidegger’s 
influence is much more apparent in The Human Condition than The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
The point holds: Arendt’s theory is informed by the same texts that are frequently cited to 
legitimize the same unjust relationships at the heart of her critique. Considering Arendt’s 
canonization within liberal discourse, it seems that the contemporary critics of injustice who 
uncritically appropriate Arendt’s assumptions are simply passing forward the same problematic 
torch that was lit by earlier Enlightenment thinkers.  
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 This is not to say that a text’s philosophical background is deterministic of its 
effectiveness. Jacques Derrida did, after all, develop deconstruction from one of Heidegger’s 
concepts. Rather, I am arguing that the acceptance of premises that contradict a text’s intended 
purpose can undermine the rhetoric of that text, and that this happens throughout the purportedly 
anti-racist sections of The Origins of Totalitarianism. Once more, the point is not that Hannah 
Arendt was racist, nor that her racism condemns the rest of her ideas, but rather that her texts are 
not stable enough to form a foundation for the anti-racist project that Human Rights theorists 
purport to construct.  
 In short, Hannah Arendt devotes one third of The Origins of Totalitarianism to an anti-
racist project, but the author’s supposed intentions are hampered by a series of contradictions in 
the assumptions that underlying her rhetoric. Namely, the theorist insists on a distinction between 
“racism” and “race-thinking” that recalls a defense of contemporary white supremacists; in 
Arendtian terms, the “white nationalists” who have recently gained prominence in the United 
States are not racists, but rather “race-thinkers,” since they add an element of nationalism to a 
politics based on racial hierarchy.  
 Arendt also assumes from a Hegelian tradition that “history” is a specific narrative of 
development from nomadism to industrialization, and that to be without a history is to be without 
the self-consciousness prerequisite for moral responsibility.  This is the idea undergirding her 
claim of later British colonists that:  
  Here they were cured of the illusion that the historical process is necessarily “progressive,” 
  for if it was the course of older colonization to trek to something, the “Dutchman trekked 
  away from everything,” and if “economic history once taught that man had developed by 
  gradual steps from a life of hunting to pastoral pursuits and finally to a settled and  
  agricultural life,” the story of the Boers clearly demonstrated that one could also come “from 
  a land that had taken the lead in a thrifty and intensive cultivation… [and] gradually become 
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  a herdsman and a hunter.” These leaders understood very well that precisely because the  
  Boers had sunk back to the level of savage tribes they remained their undisputed masters.   77
This passage contradicts two of Arendt’s other claims. First, it invalidates Arendt’s assertion that 
the Boers were somehow “innocent” in their enslavement of the Bantu people by way of their 
historical “backwardness”; if the initial Dutch settlers arrived from a land that “had taken the 
lead in a thrifty and intensive cultivation,” then these men were not the noble savage whom 
Arendt portrays the Boers as elsewhere. Second, Arendt’s discussion of this historical narrative 
as a counterexample to “progress” betrays her subscription to the hegemonic narrative of history 
that anthropologists call the masternarrative. This is ironic, considering that the theorist 
introduces Imperialism with a lamentation of the way dominant ideologies prescribe history to be 
told. It is also perplexing that the same masternarrative of economic development that Arendt 
subscribes to is that of capitalism, which is possibly the philosopher’s most consistent object of 
critique throughout her oeuvre.  
 Ultimately, this chapter reveals that Arendt’s “anti-racist” work is too contradictory and 
unstable to rely on as an ersatz for critical race theory in the Human Rights canon, so long as 
Human Rights is taken to be an anti-racist project for justice. Whether this instability be —as 
historian David Nuremberg argues — the result of an epistemological problem entrenched in 
Western thought, or instead the result of Arendt’s own biographical biases, ultimately does not 
matter. What matters is that contemporary Human Rights scholars who share Arendt’s a priori 
ideological commitments regarding history and human hierarchies are bound to err in the same 
way as the philosopher; Hegel is to Arendt what Arendt is to Roger Berkowitz, Peg Birgminham, 
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Ayten Gündoğdu, and the growing cult of critics who believe that Arendt’s oeuvre contains the 
answers to the ethical questions raised by Human Rights. 
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Conclusion: 
 I have critiqued  Hannah Arendt’s disciples who assume her ideas about humanity, persona, 
and work are the perfect premises for the advocacy and realization of a universalist human rights 
project. In chapter one, I took Ayten Gündoğdu as an exemplar of the contemporary scholars who 
perceive Arendt’s political theory as a stable starting point for creating critical theory and 
undertaking political action. I showed that Arendt’s categories of the “human” and who has 
“personhood” are unstable, and that their implementation in a “universalist” project invoking 
“humanity” is paradoxical. While Gündoğdu’s book, Rightlessness in the Age of Rights, exhibits 
exceptional critical thought, erudition and the best intention, it is ultimately a dangerous 
contribution to the social justice project it invokes.  
 I have critiqued those who cast Arendt’s theory as its own ethical project and use its 
assumed superiority to criticize human rights activists. Taking Roger Berkowitz as an exemplar 
of this school of thought, I showed that Arendt’s premises provide a defense certain of human 
rights to the detriment of others. Namely, Berkowitz invoked Arendt’s article On Little Rock to 
defend privacy and “individualism” at the cost of racial and economic equality. Extending my 
object of critique beyond this article’s explicit racism and defense of racial segregation in the 
American South, I analyzed Arendt’s claims that Nazism arose in Germany as the result of 
unprecedented socioeconomic inequality. I invoked Etienne Balibar’s notion of equaliberty to 
reveal the contradictory nature of Arendt’s rhetoric by way of Berkowitz; to claim that equality 
causes injustice is akin to saying that justice causes injustice. My extension of Balibar’s 
argument involves the assumption that “equality” is entangled with historical conceptions of 
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“justice,” for which I cite as evidence Saussure’s “immutability” of the scales as an ancient 
Western symbol of justice. This chapter, like the first, reveals the necessity for close reading in 
any justice project that aims to claim authority through appeals to a canonical. When scholars 
like Roger Berkowitz construct a defense of individualism and privacy by assuming pre-existing 
binaries like justice-equality and privacy-desegregation, it seems that reading Arendt more 
closely would help them better realize their intentions.  
 While chapter three emphasized race and the contradictory assumptions Arendt accepts in 
order to narrate her critical history of South Africa, a close reading of classist ideas would 
complement this chapter. In tandem with racist ideology, the “struggle of classes” is the other 
dominant narration of history according to the philosopher. Assumptions about class are clearly 
fundamental to Arendt’s theory as she develops her ideas in The Human Condition, as evidenced 
by the book’s project of distinguishing and hierarchizing work, labor, and action. The 
entanglement of class and morality is also prevalent in The Origins of Totalitarianism, when 
Arendt claims of the Boer people that “Their poverty is almost exclusively the consequence of 
their contempt for work and their adjustment to the way of life of black tribes.”  While I did 78
show Arendt’s assumptions about nature, history and morality to be unstable when we close read 
racism and humanity in The Origins of Totalitarianism, a close reading of class in her oeuvre 
would advance this critical project. 
 As I conclude this paper, the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and the Humanities at Bard 
College is preparing to host a panel featuring Lucian Wintrich. Wintrich is a White House Press 
Corps member and writer for the alt-right publication, Gateway Pundit. He is infamous for his 
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provocative interviews — which often include the hateful derision of trans people and people 
“below a certain income bracket” — and his 2016 photography exhibit, “Twinks for Trump.” 
Wintrich was invited, by Arendt Center founder Roger Berkowitz, as a interlocutor on a panel 
discussing “Free Speech and Academic Freedom.” The equivalence of hate speech to freedom 
recalls the Arendtian formulation that racial segregation is fundamental to deterring the next 
totalitarian regime. This controversial event helps, however ephemerally, to further 
professionalize hatred, and arises out of one of the several binaries uncritically inherited by 
Arendt and her disciples. The fact that Wintrich was educated within this exact liberal tradition at 
Bard College speaks to the necessity for the deconstruction of these assumptions.  
 There is an intellectual continuity at the heart of this critique: canonical philosophers like 
Hegel are to Arendt what Arendt is to her contemporary disciples in Human Rights. This 
tradition includes ideological assumptions about personhood, race, and class that preclude its 
ability to effectively generate the ethical and anti-racist theory that the Human Rights discipline 
ought to cherish. This is not to say that the reactionary ideas within the Western canon preclude 
its works from inspiring effective ethical thought. Rather, such works as Arendt's -- especially 
considering their centrality to the Human Rights discipline -- mandate close reading and 
contemplation if they are to be given authority on the topics of justice and human relations. The 
paradoxes underlying Arendt's critical thought are not just logical fallacies; they are constitutive 
of a deeply entrenched ethical problem that is bound to recur without deconstruction. 
 I still haven't explicitly proposed a resolution to the problem of inheriting reactionary 
assumptions about people and ethics. Of course, I too am writing from the position of a student 
whose education is part of the liberal tradition at the heart of this critique. Throughout this 
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project, I encountered many assumptions of my own that made writing difficult; I, too, am 
Jacques Derrida’s bricoleur. My critique of personhood and humanity as these ideas are 
discussed by Arendt and Gündoğdu was particularly difficult to write; in earlier drafts I found 
myself defaulting to the taxonomical language of biology privileged by the same liberal tradition 
at the heart of my critique. This made finding effective language to discuss the politics of 
“human rights” incredibly difficult, but it also led me to re-evaluate my own epistemological 
assumptions. It was not until revisiting Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities late in the 
semester and contemplating Roger Berkowitz’ use of the word “imagination” that I realized 
humanity is itself an imagined community. Furthermore, when discussing Human Rights, this 
category is usually imagined as part of a hegemonic liberal ideology — just like the distinction 
between public and private in Berkowitz’ essay. That this revelation took so much time, despite 
my persistent intuition of the idea, serves to show my status as both subject and object of this 
critique. The same education that gave me the language to write this paper also more deeply 
ingrained my acceptance of the epistemological hegemony of science, which led me to my initial 
aporetic response to Gündoğdu in biological terms.  
 This is not a paradox. Rather, there is a way to read canonical texts like Arendt’s that 
contributes to the improvement of Human Rights as a project for social justice. Derrida’s 
proposal of deconstruction was, after all, informed by his reading of Arendt’s mentor, Heidegger. 
I am not criticizing that Hannah Arendt has been canonized, but rather the hagiographic way that 
her texts tend to be read by the scholars who affirm her centrality within the Human Rights 
discipline. As I showed in my third chapter, Arendt’s works brim with assumptions about 
humanity, race, nature and history that resemble the arguments of contemporary white 
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supremacists much more frequently than those of radical critical theorists. The fact that Arendt’s 
critical work advances reactionary premises is not necessarily deterministic of its ability to 
contribute to a justice project, but it does limit its efficacy unless we read the texts closely.  
 In conclusion, my critique of Hannah Arendt’s canonization within Human Rights critical 
theory — and the academic discipline more broadly — arises from the way inherited ideological 
assumptions can haunt “human rights” in its manifold expressions as a justice project. Namely, 
Arendt and many of her disciples perpetuate longstanding assumptions about humanity and 
justice that undermine the ability of their ideas to condemn and deter injustice, especially racial 
injustice. In 2017, when members of an “alt-right” movement are in positions of political 
authority, and racist violence is rampant in the United States, the facility with which Arendtian 
assumptions dovetail with reactionary politics is especially startling. Through this project I have 
found myself according with thinkers like Jacques Derrida, Barbara Johnson and Judith Butler, 
who see close, deconstructionist reading as an ethical imperative. How we read Arendt and other 
members of the canon is a political act; this is illustrated by the distinctions between my readings 
of Arendt and those of scholars like Roger Berkowitz and Ayten Gündoğdu.  
 For now, Arendt’s late life comment on how a text should be evaluated deals with part of 
the problem: 
  Each time you write something and you send it out into the world and it becomes public,  
  obviously everybody is free to do with it what he pleases, and this is as it should be. I do  
  not have any quarrel with this. You should not try to hold your hand now on whatever  
  may happen to what you have been thinking for yourself.  79
This paper is ultimately about the understated possibilities of this freedom. Close reading itself 
has become a kind of justice project. While one ought to be free to do with a text what they 
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please, one also ought to think about the ethical implications of reading. If Hannah Arendt is to 
be sacralized as today’s preeminent social justice muse, this paper demands for Arendt the kind 
of reader Derrida was to Heidegger.  
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